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For discussion…  Two  years  after  the  financial  crisis 
broke out, the US Congress has voted 
the  Dodd-Frank  “Wall  Street  Reform 
and  Consumer  Protection  Act”  with 
the  stated  aim  to  create  a  sound 
economic  foundation,  to  grow  jobs, 
protect consumers, rein in Wall Street, 
end too big to fail and prevent another 
financial crisis. 
This  imposing  piece  of  legislation
1  is 
important. It will reshape the financial 
landscape in the US and thus influence 










1 This paper is based on the brief summary of the 
Dodd-Frank  Wall  Street  reform  and  consumer 
protection  act  published  by  the  banking 
committee of the US Congress. 
Also,  its  impact  on  the  world  largest 
market will affect the final outcome of 
the crisis and the future course of the 
global economy. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of 
this  new  legislation  we  have  first  to 
compare  the  voted  measures  to  the 
ones we proposed in previous papers
2 
in  our  analysis  of  the  causes  of  the 






















The possible outcomes of the crisis and the 
proposed measures to a long lasting solution 
 
 
he analysis of the main causes of the financial crisis presented in our 
original paper led to three possible scenarios that could follow the 
crisis. 
The first one considered a quick and painless rebound that has evidently 
not occurred. 
The second scenario explored the possibility of a deepening recession and 
market weakness.  
Only the third scenario suggested a path towards a long lasting recovery. It 
required  a  balanced  approach  and  sustained  cooperation  between  the 
main participants, each putting in place the appropriate measures falling 
within its sphere of competence and responsibility. 
As such we proposed that: 
  Governments present a composed attitude to reassure the public 
and avoid interfering in areas outside their competence. Equally 
important  is  their  capacity  to  resist  the  temptation  to  scatter 
borrowed  funds  for  political  purposes.  It  is  important  that 
governments preserve their limited financial firepower and apply it 
to critical bail outs and support of the economy to stimulate future 
growth, innovation and entrepreneurship. 
  Central banks improve their capacity to identify financial bubbles 
and act early to restrain them. 
T 
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  Regulators fulfill their pivotal responsibilities by: 
-  reviewing  the  current  failed  risk  models  that  relied  too 
much  on  the  past  and  introducing  a  dose  of  behavioural 
factors as well as more stringent stress tests. 
-  curbing  excessive  short  term  based  remuneration  and 
promoting  reliance  on  traditional  and  experienced  risk 
departments. 
-  extending their reach to establish adequate ethical rules for 
key service providers such as rating agencies and auditing 
firms  who  played a  role  in  the  crisis. The  extent  of  their 
intervention  will  be  delicate  as  regulators  should  avoid  a 
heavy handed approach that would directly interfere with 
the risk appetite of financial institutions. 
  Financial  institutions  address  the  risk  management  shortcomings 
that were highlighted by the crisis, for example, by reconsidering 
their  risk  measurement  models  and  reconstituting  proper  credit 
risk  evaluation  departments,  relying  less  on  rating  agencies  and 
more on experienced risk managers, separating their approach to 
selling  financial  products  and  managing  inter  alia  the  credit, 
liquidity and interest rate risks. 
The Banks should rein in the short term culture promoted all across 
their organizations through immediate bonuses and stock options 
at  management  level,  while  preserving  their  capacity  to  attract 
innovative talent. 
  Finally, members of Bank boards of directors need to improve their 
understanding  of  new,  sophisticated  financial  products,  an 
appreciation that does not come necessarily with experience, but 












efore looking into the highlights of the legislation, three preliminary 
remarks seem appropriate: 
  The indispensable collaboration of the main partakers in the crisis 
in shaping the new bill does not seem to have taken place. As a 
result, this legislation appears almost entirely to be the one sided 
product of the political process. 
  As stated in its title, this is a Wall Street reform bill. It is centered on 
banks  and  private  financial  institutions.  Its  main  goal  is  not  to 
reform  government  agencies,  regulators  and  central  banks  even 
though they all played a crucial role in the built up of the crisis and 
if some changes to these official entities are proposed, they are 
presumably incidental to the main objective.  
As a result, the bill does not seem to seek to establish a comprehensive 
solution to the crisis. 
   - Finally, the bill covers only entities doing business in or from the 
US. In a global financial system, it can only have a partial impact 
and even distort competition unless the same rules are applied to 
the main financial centers around the world. 
This  surprising  limitation  is  to  be  expected  since  the  US  Congress  is 
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established a set of relationships with their counterparts in other financial 
markets and agreed to common rules that allowed for consistent controls 
over the global financial network. The bill leaves some leeway to regulators 
to integrate international agreements such as Basel III. However, it does 
introduce restrictions that might not been agreed upon by other countries 











e shall analyze the measures in the order Congress has presented 
them. 
1.  Consumer protections with authority and independence 
In  creating  a  consumer  financial  protection  bureau,  the  US  legislator 
consolidates the responsibilities of various government agencies into one 
bureau  accountable  for  consumer  protections.  The  new  bureau  has 
sufficient powers to supervise consumer lenders, propose new regulation, 
and  act  fast  when  identifying  new  products  that  are  bad  deals  for 
consumers. Congress does not define strictly the type of problems that the 
new entity should look into.  
Despite its duty to educate through the creation of a new office of financial 
literacy,  it  is  not  clear  whether  such  a  bureau  would  have  stopped 
mortgage  borrowers  from  overextending  themselves  in  an  overheated 
housing market. 
Beyond the political benefit the legislator might derive from supporting 
such a reform measure, there may be a real need for such a protection 
watchdog in the US.  But the relevance to the 2008 financial crisis or to the 
next financial crisis seems remote, apart from the fact that the bill provides 
the  government  with  a  regulatory  body that will  be  clearly  responsible 
when the next problem that affects the consumer comes along. 
W 
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The cost to the consumer financial services industry is difficult to measure, 
as better defined oversight provided by the new regulatory body might 
compensate  for  some  of  the  added  cost  burden  of  a  new  agency.  So, 
unless the new agency regulates prices and tariffs ( in which case there 
could be a substantial bearing on banks profits ), the impact of establishing 
the new regulatory body on the financial sector itself should be minimal. 
2.  The financial stability oversight council 
Made up of ten federal financial regulators, an independent member and 
five non-voting members (all from the regulatory world), the council will 
be charged with identifying and responding to emerging risks throughout 
the financial system. 
In  our  previous  papers  we  highlighted  the  need  to  detect  emerging 
financial bubbles and providing the central banks with clear guidelines and 
powers to react to it (mostly through interest rate and monetary policies) 
in order to stabilize a speculative situation before it got out of control.  
It can easily be argued that even in the last stages of the crisis ( from 2004 
on ) a rise in interest rates would have gone a long way towards cooling 
down  the  real  estate  market,  thus  mitigating  if  not  eliminating  the 
dramatic outcome of 2008. Also, once the bubble was detected, it would 
have been easy for regulators to identify organizations at risk and prompt 
them to adopt more conservative lending practices. 
Therefore  this  provision  seems,  at  first  glance,  to  respond  our  earlier 
recommendation.  Indeed,  one  of  its  stated  goals  is  to  make  risks 
transparent by identifying emerging risks in the economy. 
However, this measure falls short in many ways: 
  The  council  is  composed  of  an  overwhelming  majority  of 
government official and regulators. Clearly, bankers, hedge funds 
managers and professionals from rating agencies, who are on the 
cutting edge of market trends, would be needed to provide the 
committee with vital market insight. Instead, the council will now  
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suffer from a serious lack of hands-on expertise. The creation of a 
new  office  of  financial  research  staffed  with  economists, 
accountants, lawyers and former supervisors to advise the council 
cannot really alleviate this shortfall of competence. 
  More significantly, the measure creates an observation body but 
does not target financial bubbles or specifically require a proactive 
policy on the part of the Federal Reserve to counteract this type of 
market excess.   
  An important objective of the council is to avoid the rise in and 
complexity of financial organizations and if necessary, empower the 
Federal Reserve to act to break up financial institutions that have 
grown to be a potential threat to the system. This applies to banks, 
but can also be extended to other financial companies. It is easy to 
see how this measure protects the legislator from bearing the brunt 
of criticism in the case of another Bear Sterns type bail out. It is 
more difficult to understand why such drastic limitations should be 
imposed on US banks, as these restrictions, inevitably entail in the 
long  term  a  loss  of  international  competitiveness  and  lack  of 
innovation for US banks operating in a global market where foreign 
banks are not facing the same restrictions. 
This  provision  shows  that  politicians  have  understood  the  need  for  a 
macroeconomic approach to detect unfavourable trends in the financial 
markets  that  pose  a  risk  of  future  systemic  difficulties.  However,  the 
measures voted to respond to the consequences of the 2008 crisis, are 
framed  by  politicians  suspicious  of  large  financial  entities  that  trade 
instruments  they  do  not  understand.  In  doing  so,  they  missed  the 
opportunity to take the appropriate measures and address one of the main 
weaknesses  brought  to  light  by  the  events  of  2008:    the  incapacity  to 
identify and prevent financial bubbles in a timely manner. 
Moreover, the recommendations by congress to the federal reserve for the 
application of increasingly strict rules as a financial institution expands and 
the  provision  for  regulators  to  break  up  the  institutions  deemed  to 
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represent the greatest systemic risk will inevitably rein in growth for US 
financial  institutions,  most  likely  by  influencing  boards  and  CEO’s  into 
avoiding growth and innovative financial products 
3.  Ending too big to fail bail outs 
This provision aims to protect tax payers from being on the hook to save a 
troubled financial institution or to cover the cost of its liquidation. 
Under this heading, several provisions have been voted. Three of them 
could have a profound impact on the banking system. 
-  Funeral plans: Large complex financial companies will be required to 
periodically submit plans for their rapid and orderly shutdown should 
the company go under. Other rules limit the amounts that the FDIC 
can insure to what it expects to be repaid from the company, when it 
is liquidated, by making sure that the cost is borne by the financial 
firms not the taxpayer. 
This set of regulations might work in case of isolated problems and 
therefore can give the illusion that a proper tax payer protection plan 
is in place. But would it work in times of widespread systemic crisis? 
The reality is that 2008 type of breakdown requires immediate help to 
failing institutions in order to avoid a domino effect. There is certainly 
no time for consultation between treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC 
as requested by the bill.  
Moreover, experience shows that asset prices fall precipitously in such 
times and the FDIC will be at a loss to estimate the liquidation value of 
the institution which in turn establishes the maximum amount it can 
lend. Under these new rules, the FDIC would practically be paralysed. 
Finally,  any  hesitation  or  limitation  in  the  rescue  process  by  the 
regulatory  bodies  will  be  quickly  noticed  by  the  market  and  could 
worsen the crisis.    
  Volker  rule:  this  rule  proposed  by  the  former  chairman  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  and  adopted  by  Congress  requires  the  
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implementation  of  regulations  to  prohibit  proprietary  trading, 
investment in and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity 
funds. It is clear that neither hedge funds nor private equity funds 
caused or were involved in the unfolding of the financial meltdown 
and so their relationship with banks was peripheral to the main 
events. 
It is therefore difficult to understand the purpose of this rule other 
than being a nostalgic attempt to refocus the attention of banks on 
their  lending  business  by  limiting  the  benefits  of  40  years  of 
innovation  from  their  activities.  As  mentioned  in  our  previous 
papers, the crisis highlighted the need for banks to review their 
over  reliance  on  models  and  rating-based  assessment  of  credit 
risks.  Instead  of  addressing  this  point  positively  by  proposing 
relevant regulatory guidelines, the rule is a negative approach that 
does not correct the credit risk flaws in the banking system. What it 
does though is weigh on the profitability of banks and eliminate 
banking-originated competition for independent hedge funds and 
private equity funds. 
  Under the heading of Federal Reserve emergency lending and limits 
on  debt  guarantees,  the  legislator  first  prohibits  the  Federal 
Reserve  bailing  out  individual  companies.  Lending  programs  are 
allowed  but  they  must  be  broad  based  and  carry  sufficient 
collateral to protect tax payers. 
As well, it allows the FDIC to guarantee debt of solvent insured 
banks but only after meeting serious requirements such as Treasury 
secretary approval and expedited congressional approval. 
Again such measures would only restrict decisive action in times of 
extreme  disruption.  As  an  example,  what  would  have  been  the 
definition of a solvent bank in the fall of 2008 when the interbank 
market was practically paralyzed? In a panic of such proportions, all 
financial  institutions  are  vulnerable  until  the  financial  markets 
return to normal. 
What it does 
though is weigh 
on the profitability 









In short, this chapter of the bill might protect the taxpayer in the short 
term  but  could  worsen  significantly  a  future  financial  meltdown  with 
considerable adverse consequences to the economy and ultimately the 
average taxpayer. 
4.  Reforming the Federal Reserve 
The  main  purpose  of  this  section  of  the  bill  is  to  restrain  the  Federal 
Reserve  in  cases  of  emergency  lending  and  debt  guarantees.  It  also 
imposes several supervisory procedures on this institution. 
First, the GAO is asked to conduct on a one time basis an audit of the 
Federal Reserve as well as a study on the current system for appointing 
Federal Reserve directors. On a more permanent basis, the GAO will have 
authority to audit discount window lending and open market transactions.  
Finally, a set of transparency disclosures on operations and internal rules 
(including  the  creation  of  a  vice  chairman  for  supervision  position) 
complete the new framework. 
In  2008,  at  the  height  of  the  crisis,  the  Federal  Reserve  provided  or 
pledged extremely large amounts and it is understandable that Congress 
would worry about such unchecked power and try to rein it in. 
It is also true that it was the swift coordinated and decisive action of the 
central banks worldwide that avoided a complete collapse of the banking 
system. Such response will not be possible in the future on the part of the 
Federal Reserve alone and the process will be delayed considerably. 
In its restrictive approach, Congress has missed a chance to extend the 
mandate of the SEC to the prevention of financial bubbles. Furthermore, it 
has taken away some of its emergency intervention powers leaving the 
whole US financial system in a much more vulnerable position. 
5.  Creating transparency and accountability for derivatives 
Some derivatives such as CDS ( credit default swaps ) did play a role in the 
financial  meltdown  by  giving  investors  the  false  impression  that  their 
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positions  were  hedged  and  allowing,  through  loopholes  in  accounting 
standards,  reduced  capital  requirements.  As  explained  in  our  previous 
papers, the problem did not arise from the use of complicated instruments 
or  the  way  the  markets  were  structured  but  rather  from  models  that 
required  a  uniform  assessment  of  credit  risks  (provided  by  the  rating 
agencies). This over centralisation in the hands of unseasoned analysts 
replaced  a  much  safer  and  broadly  based  appreciation  of  risk  by 
departments  staffed  with  experienced  professionals  in  each  and  every 
bank. 
This fundamental flaw is not corrected or even taken into consideration by 
the new rules. 
Instead, the intention is to regulate derivatives as widely as possible. In 
particular, it directs the SEC and the CFTC towards regulation of over the 
counter derivatives; requires central clearing and exchange trading with a 
role  for  regulators  and  clearing  houses  to  determine  which  contracts 
should be cleared; puts in place data collection and publication systems to 
ensure market transparency; provide regulators with sufficient authority 
to impose sufficient capital and margin requirements; finally it establishes 
a code of conduct  vis a vis their counterparties for all registered swap 
dealers. 
This new set of requirements is generally sensible and should not interfere 
with a growing derivative market. Will this new tool and the information it 
provides be sufficient to allow regulators to detect any emerging financial 
bubble (which inevitably will have a derivative component) and allow them 
to respond in a timely fashion? This capacity will depend on the attitude of 
regulators more than on the bill itself.  
One thing is clear: the clampdown on the lucrative OTC derivatives will 
reduce large banks profits. 
One thing is clear: 
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6.  Mortgage reform 
The most important obligation under this heading is that lenders ensure a 
borrower’s  ability  to  repay.  It  establishes  a  federal  standard  in  that 
respect. 
The other measures listed under this heading are meant to enforce this 
important requirement.  
It is obvious that had this rule been in force in the past years, the subprime 
crisis would not have occurred. In that sense it is a good initiative that will 
protect the consumer in the future. Even though banks have, for the time 
being, learned their lesson and, as witnessed by a sluggish private real 
estate market,  tightened their lending criteria this rule enacts prudence in 
the housing market finance. 
In all likelihood, this provision will not affect future speculative situations 
because financial speculation is recurrent but rarely if ever repeats itself. 
The mortgage reform can therefore be considered as a good measure to 
protect  the  public  and  improve  the  quality  of  lending  to  the  housing 
market. In terms of avoiding future financial speculation, its usefulness is 
arguably low.  
7.  Hedge funds 
In the blame game that followed the crisis, hedge funds were one of the 
favourite  targets  of  politicians.  Their  secretive  attitude,  the  speculative 
nature of their trades and the huge amounts they managed, turned them 
into the perfect suspects.  
The  reality  is  that  they  were  neither  at  the  root  of  the  real  estate 
speculation that turned into the subprime situation nor instrumental in 
aggravating the last phases of the crisis. 
Nevertheless,  government  have  long  been  uncomfortable  with  the  fast 
growing and financially powerful industry while at the same time careful in  
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preserving  the  potential  advantage  of  keeping  in  the  US  a  key  but 
geographically very mobile component of modern finance. 
The  outcome  is  a  rather  mild  regulation  that  requires  hedge  funds  to 
register with the SEC and more importantly to provide information about 
their trading activities, necessary for regulators to assess systemic risk.  
It is difficult to forecast whether such rules could trigger the departure of 
these highly secretive organizations to more inviting countries. It probably 
will depend on how the administration will apply the new rules.  
For the time being, this part of the bill does not address any cause of the 
2008 meltdown. It might in the future give some warning of a growing 
bubble through a better insight into hedge funds trades, but only on a 
partial basis because of the global nature of this industry.   
8.  Credit rating agencies 
The widespread use of credit ratings in financial evaluation models put 
credit rating agencies at the heart of the crisis.  
The overwhelming responsibility these agencies carry in the conduct of 
modern finance and their oligopolistic situation require a strict oversight. 
This  need  has  been  well  recognized  by  the  US  Congress.  The  new 
requirements  include  methodology  disclosure  and  use  of  independent 
information. More importantly, it allows investors to bring private rights of 
action against them. Conflicts of interest are also tackled but do not go as 
far as shifting the payments of fees from paper issuers to investors. Also it 
perpetuates a centralized system of credit risk measurement that amplifies 
any incorrect assessment. 
Here the bill comes closer to fixing one of the main causes of the crisis.   
9.  Executive compensation and corporate governance 
The rise of shorterm-ism is at the root of the 2008 financial breakdown. It 
affected  individuals,  regulators,  politicians  and  of  course  banks.  The 
escalating  amounts  and  the  structure  of  executive  compensation  
20 
accelerated  the  process.  Stock  options  in  particular  aligned  banks’ 
management time horizon to stock market short term vision. 
The issue had to be addressed but the proposed measures fall short of an 
adequate solution. 
Shareholders will now have the right to vote on executive pay but only in a 
non binding manner which of course undermines the intent. 
Compensation  committees  will  include  only  independent  directors.  The 
principle  is  sound  but  it  might  create  an  incentive  for  management  to 
increase the proportion of friendly and less challenging directors. 
10.  Securitization 
The new rules require that companies that sell securitized products retain 
at least 5% of the credit risk, unless the underlying loan meets standard 
that reduces riskiness. A better disclosure requirement on the quality of 
the underlying asset also improves transparency. 
Although 5% could be insufficient to deter reckless sale of risky paper, this 
provision will clearly have banks think twice before they enter into a loan 
with the exclusive intention to securitize it. 
Such constraints go in the right direction. They seem too mild to seriously 
deter banks in the context of a securitized-fuelled speculative bubble. 
What it will do in the future however is curtail even further the availability 
of legitimate securitized debt in view of the progressive burden it creates 
on banks` balance sheets. 
11.  Other measures 
Various other measures are included in the bill that are loosely related to 
the past crisis. 
Some of them such as improvements to bank and thrift regulations tighten 
the implementation of provisions already discussed. Tackling the effect of 
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the  mortgage  crisis  deals  with  emergency  mortgage  relief  or 
neighbourhood stabilization program. 
Others  aim  at  regulating  insurance,  municipal  securities  industry  and 
brokerage industry to protect further the investor. 
A few like interchanges fees, credit score protections or transparency for 
extraction industry including Congo conflict minerals are more a reflection 
of the political process in the US Congress rather than a solution to future 
financial problems. 
Finally, the creation of a consumer financial watchdog with consolidated, 
well defined powers and the capacity to act fast is good news for bank 
clients. On the other hand, it could affect some lucrative bank business 
such as credit cards. 
Finally, the bill leaves reasonable room for regulators to adjust to market 
conditions and the competitive international financial landscape. Its final 
impact  will  then  depend  on  the  way  it  will  be  applied.  However  the 
legislator stated aims are clear and unequivocal to the point where certain 




Does the Dodd-Frank reach its stated aims? 
 
 
et us recall that the US Congress has voted the bill in order to “create a 
sound economic foundation to grow jobs, protect consumers, rein in 
Wall Street, end too big to fail and prevent another financial crisis.” 
1.  Rein in Wall Street, end too big to fail 
Most regulations under this heading are aimed at restraining banks. 
Several  provisions  will  reduce  banks  net  results.  The  important 
contribution of OTC derivatives and perhaps credit cards to bank profits 
are  bound  to  decline.  Also  the  new  conditions  imposed  on  extending 
mortgages will restrict the volume of these lucrative loans. 
The too big to fail requirements, as discussed above, might not be helpful 
in  times  of  systemic  crisis.  Moreover  it  could  have  other  undesirable 
effects. 
By putting a lid on bank size, the Volcker rule caps the expansion potential 
of large banks. This will have an adverse effect on their share price which 
will lose the growth premium enjoyed previously. 
The  psychological  effect  of  the  yearly  liquidation  plan  -  the  so  called 
funeral plans - on management is difficult to measure but will certainly 
point toward a more conservative approach to business on their part. 
Finally, US banks will be required under Basel III to raise more capital by 
international regulators at a time when their market related profits are 
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under  pressure,  their  share  price  reflects  their  reduced  potential  for 
growth and while they face a less restrained competition in global markets. 
Under such conditions and considering that sophisticated high margin new 
financial products will be under close scrutiny, the main way out for banks 
will be to squeeze as much profit as they can from their main lending 
business.  This  means  that  they  will  try  first  to  contain  bad  debts  by 
applying even more stringent lending criterias thus reducing the amount of 
credit they extend while at the same time exacting larger spreads on loans 
and increasing the cost of borrowing throughout the whole economy. 
As for reining in Wall Street, the objective is only partially reached as other 
actors such as hedge funds face much lighter requirements and will retain 
the capacity to move markets significantly. 
2.  Protect consumers 
Consumer protection is well covered by the bill. 
The  new  directives  on  extending  mortgage  loans  and  improving 
transparency on bank loans will probably be quite efficient.  
The new supervision of the insurance industry as well as the authority of 
the SEC to impose fiduciary duties on brokers will also in time improve 
consumer and small investor protection. 
The creation of a consumer watchdog completes the process and should 
bring a real improvement in consumer protection. 
It  might  also  inhibit  a  new  sub  prime  type  crisis  in  the  future  but  the 
probability of further excesses in that area is very low in any case. 
3.  Prevent another financial crisis 
The  recommendations  made  under  scenario  three  to  rectify  the 
shortcomings that lead to the 2008 crisis and to build a path toward a long 
lasting recovery, are only matched in the case of rating agencies oversight. 
Some other suggestions are partially met but nevertheless, it is clear that,  
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within the logic of our original paper that the new bill will not prevent 
another financial crisis.  
Indeed, the recent sovereign debt scare in the European Union, a clear 
consequence  of  our  scenario  two,  has  shown  that  governments  were 
unprepared for a financial meltdown induced by their own excesses. It is 
also easy to see that none of the measures of this bill could significantly 
prevent such occurrence. 
Furthermore, the new restrictions introduced by the Dodd Frank bill will 
delay fast and decisive action from the Federal Reserve needed in case of 
acute financial meltdown. Accordingly, the window of opportunity to quell 
an imminent systemic downward spiral could be missed. It is even possible 
to argue that such window of opportunity might not  exist anymore as 
banks will have now by law to be put into liquidation under the funeral 
plan  at  a  early  stage,  triggering  more  difficulties  for  other  banks  and 
quickly  creating  a  chain  reaction  of  financial  institutions  going  into 
bankruptcy. 
4.  Create a sound economic foundation to grow jobs 
Faced  with  a  new  legislation  that  will  at  the  same  time  deplete  their 
profits, weigh on their share price and require additional capital, the logical 
response of banks as a business will be to apply stringent risk criteria to 
avoid bad debts, curtail their lending to preserve capital and increase their 
interest spread to enhance profitability. In view of the pivotal role of banks 
in  the  economy,  all  these  actions  can  only  slow  down  any  potential 
recovery. 
In that sense it is difficult to see how the Dodd-Frank bill could grow jobs. 
What  is  more  likely  is  that  faced  with  low  growth  economy  and  high 
unemployment  the  federal  government  and  the  Federal  Reserve  will 
continue their policy of high deficits through government spending and 
artificially low interest rates. Such policy which, so far, has not produced 
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 y  introducing  consumer  protection  legislation  and  hitting  hard  on 
banks, the Dodd-Frank bill has been designed for political success. 
However, it does not address most of the original causes of the crisis in 
part because it is not the result of an essential collaboration between the 
main actors of the 2008 unprecedented events. The US politicians have 
thus largely missed a unique opportunity to moderate future excesses and 
reduce the chances to set the economy and the markets on a smoother 
path along the lines of scenario 3 presented in my previous papers. 
In fact our analysis shows that they might have increased significantly the 
risk of future volatility. 
The  contraction  and  increased  cost  of  bank  lending  that  is  the  logical 
consequence of the bill will in the long term hinder economic growth. Then 
the  Federal  government  through  various  stimulus  plans  and  support  to 
states will feel compelled to boost its spending increasing then the risks of 
a sovereign debt crisis. These factors increase the chances of a scenario 2 
type downward spiral. 
At  the  same  time,  the  very  low  interest  rate  policy  will  have  to  be 
maintained  much  longer  than  anticipated  prompting  investors  to  take 
undue  risks  in  search  of  better  returns.  Also  the  huge  liquidity  in  the 
system created by an uncontrolled rise in public debt is able to fuel new 
speculative  bubbles.  This  works  in  favour  of  a  scenario  1  type  of 
speculative bubble. 
Our  conclusion  is  therefore  that  in  the  current  tug  of  war  between 
scenario  one  and  two,  this  bill,  as  it  starts  to  be  applied,  will  further 
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increase the tension between the two possible outcomes. In other words, 
the equilibrium that has prevailed since end of 2009
1 will become even 
more unstable and when it breaks down, the chances of a more severe 
outcome one way or another will have risen. Only that this time around, 
the treasury and the Federal Reserve will not be allowed to take the quick 
emergency measures that saved the world economy from a full depression 
in 2008. 
                                                      
1 The financial crisis one year later: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/crisis/?l=en 3  
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